Zip Bomb in Lookyloo Capture Upload Allows Denial of Service
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fix or patch referenced
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Lookyloo did not enforce limits on the decompressed size of uploaded capture archives and compressed HAR files. An attacker could submit a specially crafted ZIP, gzip, or zlib-compressed capture containing data that expands to a very large size during processing. Because the application decompressed this content directly in memory without first limiting the output size, processing the malicious capture could exhaust available memory, terminate a web or worker process, or make the Lookyloo instance unavailable. The vulnerability affects both full Lookyloo capture archive imports and API submissions containing gzip-compressed HAR data. Repeated exploitation could cause a persistent denial-of-service condition until the affected processes or instance are restarted. The patch introduces: • A 1 GB cumulative uncompressed-size limit for imported capture archives. • Size-limited gzip and zlib decompression for compressed HAR files. • Explicit detection and handling of suspected zip bombs. • An HTTP 400 response when an oversized compressed HAR file is submitted through the API.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- lookyloo lookyloo
through 1.40.0