RabbitMQ: protected tag bypass via bulk-delete
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: total
Summary
RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 3.13.0 until 3.13.15 and 4.0.20 and 4.1.11 and 4.2.6, protected tag bypass via bulk-delete. dELETE /api/users/:name refuses to delete users tagged protected (rabbitmgmtwmuser:deleteresource/2 checks isprotecteduser). POST /api/users/bulk-delete iterates the supplied username list and calls rabbitauthbackendinternal:deleteuser/2 directly , that function has no protected-tag check , so the guard is silently An administrator can delete protected-tagged service accounts via the bulk endpoint, bypassing a safeguard the test suite confirms is rabbitmqmanagement enabled Attacker has the administrator tag A protected-tagged user. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15 and 4.0.20 and 4.1.11 and 4.2.6.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- rabbitmq rabbitmq-server
From 3.13.0 · fixed in 3.13.15; From 4.0.0 · fixed in 4.0.20; From 4.1.0 · fixed in 4.1.11; From 4.2.0 · fixed in 4.2.6
- rabbitmqBitnami
From 3.13.0 · fixed in 3.13.15; From 4.0.0 · fixed in 4.0.20; From 4.1.0 · fixed in 4.1.11; From 4.2.0 · fixed in 4.2.6