OpenReception: invite confirmation token is replayable within its validity window and re-issues a registration-bootstrap cookie
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 2.2.1
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
OpenReception, an appointment booking platform with end-to-end encryption, is affected by a flaw in its invite confirmation process. An attacker who obtains a pending invite token can reuse it to register their own passkey on the invited account, gaining control of that account and, for staff or tenant-admin invites, the associated tenant access.
Summarized by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5. Verify details against the original sources.
Read the original description
OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 2.2.1, an attacker who captures a pending invite token can replay it to obtain a passkey-registration credential and register their own passkey on the invited account, taking control of that account. For a staff or tenant-admin invite this yields access to the tenant context tied to that account. This issue has been patched in version 2.2.1.
Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
Affected versions
- open-reception appointment-booking-software
fixed in 2.2.1