kho: skip KHO for crash kernel
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: kho: skip KHO for crash kernel kho_fill_kimage() unconditionally populates the kimage with KHO metadata for every kexec image type. When the image is a crash kernel, this can be problematic as the crash kernel can run in a small reserved region and the KHO scratch areas can sit outside it. The crash kernel then faults during kho_memory_init() when it tries phys_to_virt() on the KHO FDT address: Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address xxxxxxxx ... fdt_offset_ptr+... fdt_check_node_offset_+... fdt_first_property_offset+... fdt_get_property_namelen_+... fdt_getprop+... kho_memory_init+... mm_core_init+... start_kernel+... kho_locate_mem_hole() already skips KHO logic for KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH images, but kho_fill_kimage() was missing the same guard. As kho_fill_kimage() is the single point that populates image->kho.fdt and image->kho.scratch, fixing it here is sufficient for both arm64 and x86 as the FDT and boot_params path are bailing out when these fields are unset.
Timeline
- CVE published
Affected versions
- Linux Linux
Version range not reported
- Linux Linux
6.19