usb: typec: tcpm: bound altmode_desc[] per iteration in svdm_consume_modes()

Summary

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: typec: tcpm: bound altmode_desc[] per iteration in svdm_consume_modes() svdm_consume_modes() checks pmdata->altmodes against the array size once before the loop over the count, but forgot to check the bound at every point in the loop. In the well-behaved SVDM discovery flow this is harmless because each of at most SVID_DISCOVERY_MAX SVIDs contributes at most MODE_DISCOVERY_MAX modes, exactly filling altmode_desc[ALTMODE_DISCOVERY_MAX]. But the CMDT_RSP_ACK handler in tcpm_pd_svdm() does not correlate an incoming ACK with any request the port actually sent. Once port->partner is set, an unsolicited Discover Modes ACK is consumed unconditionally. A broken or malicious port partner can therefore drive altmodes to ALTMODE_DISCOVERY_MAX - 1 via the normal flow, and then send one extra Discover Modes ACK with seven VDOs. Because the pre-loop check passes, the loop could then writes up to five entries past altmode_desc[]. For mode_data_prime the next field in struct tcpm_port is the partner_altmode[] pointer array, which then receives partner-chosen SVID/VDO bytes. Move the bound check inside the loop so the array can never be indexed past ALTMODE_DISCOVERY_MAX regardless of how many VDOs the partner supplies or how the function was reached.

Timeline

1. Jul 19, 2026, 2:55 PM UTCCVE published
2. Oct 30, 2026, 12:27 PM UTCRecord last updated

Affected versions

• Linux Linux

  Version range not reported

• Linux Linux

  4.19

• KernelLinux

  From 4.19.0 · fixed in 6.6.160; From 6.7.0 · fixed in 6.12.93; From 6.13.0 · fixed in 6.18.35; From 6.19.0 · fixed in 7.0.12

References 6