USB: serial: belkin_sa: validate interrupt status length
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: serial: belkin_sa: validate interrupt status length The Belkin interrupt callback treats interrupt data as a four-byte status report and reads LSR/MSR fields at offsets 2 and 3. The interrupt-in buffer length is derived from endpoint wMaxPacketSize, and short interrupt transfers may complete successfully with a smaller actual_length. Check the completed interrupt packet length before parsing status fields so short interrupt endpoints and short successful packets are ignored instead of causing out-of-bounds or stale status-byte reads. KASAN report as below: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in belkin_sa_read_int_callback() Read of size 1 Call trace: belkin_sa_read_int_callback() (drivers/usb/serial/belkin_sa.c:202) __usb_hcd_giveback_urb() (drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1630) dummy_timer() (?:?)
Timeline
- CVE published
Affected versions
- Linux Linux
Version range not reported
- Linux Linux
2.6.12
References 8
git.kernel.org
- stable/c/f1617539ab90e67da788959bfd314076f093a11a
- stable/c/f361359a952da15e70e693c2d7dca5c5843eae3e
- stable/c/37e54d1b986df35c936d81e5b59a7aa3ec6938f0
- stable/c/ffb739a49186ea784bbd9cb91b647f062395b419
- stable/c/6a4602221cba7a738442328d66a2f0b1c9bf6e17
- stable/c/22823a319fb2afdf02cacafbed8b613b757efbc8
- stable/c/db1e7eb6203d534dad64cac2c793b69e561e657b
- stable/c/4ce058df2ee02cc2a0f0fd5cd64ce6f1482a0b65