Unbounded PBE iteration count when decrypting PKCS#8 private keys
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 2.7.0
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Allocation of resources without limits in password-based private-key decryption (PbeUtilities.GenerateCipherParameters) in Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. bc-csharp before 2.7.0 allows an attacker who can supply an encrypted private key, such as a PKCS#8 EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo or "ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY" PEM file, to cause a denial of service through CPU exhaustion via an iteration count close to 2^31, because the count is taken from the unauthenticated algorithm parameters without an upper bound and the key derivation runs before the password or the data can be checked. PKCS#5 PBES1 and PBES2 (PBKDF2), the PKCS#12 PBE algorithms and CMS password recipients (CmsPbeKey) are affected. Loading PKCS#12 files with Pkcs12Store is covered by CVE-2026-63572, and a zero or negative count with the PKCS#12 algorithms by CVE-2026-63575.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- BouncyCastle.Cryptography
fixed in 2.7.0