Redocly CLI: Path traversal when using `split` command
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 1.34.17, 2.33.2
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Redocly CLI makes OpenAPI validation, linting, and documentation workflows easier. Prior to @redocly/cli 2.33.2, the split command constructs output paths under --outDir from untrusted OpenAPI or AsyncAPI component names and x-codeSamples lang values without verifying that the resolved target remains inside the selected directory. A description containing literal ../ traversal segments in those fields can cause the split command to place or overwrite files outside --outDir. Component data remains constrained to YAML or JSON, and code-sample filenames remain based on the HTTP method, so this is not an unrestricted arbitrary-content file write. This issue is fixed in @redocly/cli version 2.33.2.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- Redocly redocly-cli
fixed in 1.34.17; From 2.0.0 · fixed in 2.33.2
- @redocly/clinpm
fixed in 1.34.17
- @redocly/clinpm
From 2.0.0 · fixed in 2.33.2