OpenAM: Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution via Class.forName in AuthXMLUtils.createCustomCallback
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 16.1.2
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: total
Summary
Open Access Management (OpenAM) is an access management solution. Prior to 16.1.2, the pre-authentication /authservice PLL endpoint accepts a CustomCallback XML element whose className value selects an arbitrary Java class for AuthXMLUtils to load and instantiate without verifying that it implements DSAMECallbackInterface. Default configurations expose the endpoint without authentication, allowing attacker-controlled class initialization and unsafe deserialization of a serialized Subject value to execute code in the server process. Enabling sunRemoteAuthSecurityEnabled does not prevent the vulnerable parsing and instantiation because its check occurs later. This issue is fixed in version 16.1.2.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- OpenIdentityPlatform OpenAM
fixed in 16.1.2
- org.openidentityplatform.openam:openam-coreMaven
fixed in 16.1.2