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CVE-2026-61629GO-2026-6539GHSA-JR34-H97M-9HPX

nginx ignition has ParseAcceptLanguage `_` separator bypass that enables ~75x CPU amplification via Accept-Language header in i18nMiddleware

Published
Last modified
published
Not listed in CISA KEV
Fix
Fixed in 2.40.1, 0.0.0-20260526022344-0c988fc1277c
None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
  • Exploitation: poc
  • Automatable: yes
  • Technical impact: partial

Summary

nginx ignition is a user interface for the nginx web server. In versions 2.29.0 through 2.40.0, the gin i18n middleware in nginx-ignition's API server runs in front of every HTTP request and calls `golang.org/x/text/language.ParseAcceptLanguage` on the raw `Accept-Language` header without imposing any size or shape filter. The underlying parser has quadratic-time behaviour on long lists of malformed language tags. The CVE-2022-32149 guard that golang.org/x/text added in v0.3.8 caps the number of `-` characters in the input at 1000, but it does not cap `_` characters even though the parser's internal scanner aliases `_` to `-` before parsing. A single unauthenticated GET request with an `Accept-Language` header built out of `_` separators burns about 2.4 seconds of server CPU on the host running nginx-ignition; ten concurrent attackers saturate a ten-core box for the duration of the attack while consuming ~10 MiB/s of upstream bandwidth. Version 2.40.1 fixes this issue.

Timeline

  1. CVE published
  2. CISA SSVC assessment

    Exploitation: poc · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial

  3. Record last updated

Affected versions

  • lucasdillmann nginx-ignition

    From 2.29.0 · fixed in 2.40.1

  • github.com/lucasdillmann/nginx-ignitionGo

    From 0.0.0-20260126024607-cbaf0fc16ed8 · fixed in 0.0.0-20260526022344-0c988fc1277c

References 3

GitHub · lucasdillmann/nginx-ignition