importModule function in MISP ignores per-organisation import module restrictions
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fix or patch referenced
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
MISP’s importModule() path used getEnabledModule() to resolve a single import module by name, but this lookup did not enforce the per-organisation module restriction checked by getEnabledModules(). As a result, an authenticated user from an organisation that was not allowed to use a module restricted via Plugin.Import_<module>_restrict could still invoke that import module directly if they knew its name. This could allow unauthorised access to restricted import-module functionality and, depending on the module and the user’s event permissions, may allow unauthorised import or modification of event data through a module that should have been unavailable to the user’s organisation.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- misp misp
through 2.5.42