Sign-tolerant HTTP/1 chunk-size parser in Mint enables response smuggling against strict intermediaries on pooled connections

Summary

Inconsistent interpretation of HTTP requests (HTTP response smuggling) vulnerability in elixir-mint mint allows a malicious HTTP/1 server to desynchronize a strict intermediary and the Mint client on the same pooled connection, enabling response-queue poisoning against subsequent requests that share the connection. The Mint.HTTP1.decode_body/5 function in lib/mint/http1.ex parses the chunk-size line of a Transfer-Encoding: chunked response with Integer.parse(data, 16). RFC 7230 defines chunk-size = 1*HEXDIG and forbids any sign prefix, but Integer.parse/2 accepts an optional leading + or -. A chunk-size line of +5 is accepted as a five-byte chunk; lines of +0 and -0 are accepted as the terminating zero-length chunk and end the message body early. An RFC-strict intermediary in the response path rejects these forms, so the intermediary and the Mint client disagree on where one response ends and the next begins. On a pooled keep-alive connection, an attacker-influenced origin can inject bytes that the client attributes to the next legitimate response on the same connection, poisoning the response queue and corrupting the responses returned to unrelated in-flight requests. This issue affects mint: from 0.1.0 before 1.9.3.

Timeline

1. Jul 16, 2026, 11:39 AM UTCCVE published
2. Jul 16, 2026, 12:37 PM UTCCISA SSVC assessment

   Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial

3. Jul 17, 2026, 10:11 AM UTCRecord last updated

Affected versions

• mint

  From 0.1.0 · fixed in 1.9.3

• elixir-mint/mint

  Version range not reported

References 4