OpenHop: Path Traversal in Flow ID File Operations
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 0.3.7, 0.3.6
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
OpenHop's server component (@openhop/server), used for creating interactive data-flow diagrams, is affected. Unauthenticated attackers can read or permanently delete .yaml files outside the intended flow directory, potentially exposing configuration data or secrets and disrupting dependent services.
Summarized by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5. Verify details against the original sources.
Read the original description
OpenHop is a tool for creating interactive data-flow diagrams. Prior to 0.3.7, `@openhop/server` passes unauthenticated flow route parameters from `GET /api/flows/:id` and `DELETE /api/flows/:id` in `packages/server/src/routes.ts` to `FlowStore.filePath()` in `packages/server/src/store.ts` without an identifier allow-list. The router applies `decodeURIComponent` to the id, and `path.join()` then normalizes traversal outside the configured flow directory after appending the .yaml extension. An attacker can read accessible YAML files as YAML-parsed JSON or permanently delete accessible .yaml files outside that directory, exposing configuration or secrets and disrupting dependent services. In `packages/server/src/index.ts`, CORS `origin: true` permits any browser origin, enabling a malicious webpage to target a loopback-bound instance. Docker deployments default to `HOST=0.0.0.0` and permit direct unauthenticated network access. This issue is fixed in repository release 0.3.7.
Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- naorsabag openhop
fixed in 0.3.7
- @openhop/servernpm
fixed in 0.3.6