phpMyFAQ - Authenticated Path Traversal in PDF Export via concatenatePaths Function
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 4.1.5
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
phpMyFAQ before 4.1.5 contains a potential authenticated path traversal vulnerability in the concatenatePaths() function within src/phpMyFAQ/Export/Pdf/Wrapper.php. A user with FAQ editing privileges can store HTML containing crafted image paths that are processed during PDF generation. The path resolution logic locates the substring "content" within a user-controlled path using strpos(); when "content" is absent, strpos() returns false, which becomes 0 when cast to an integer, preserving the entire attacker-controlled path. This path is later passed to file_get_contents() without canonicalization or root-directory containment validation, which may allow reading of files outside the intended content directory.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- phpMyFAQ phpMyFAQ
fixed in 4.1.5
- thorsten/phpmyfaqPackagist
From 4.0.0-alpha · fixed in 4.1.5
- phpmyfaq/phpmyfaqPackagist
From 4.0.0-alpha · fixed in 4.1.5