CVE-2026-57222
Suricata ippair: hash collision can cause incorrect state reuse across IPv4 and IPv6
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 8.0.6, 7.0.17
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
CISA's decision points: whether it is exploited, whether attacks can be automated, and how much control an attacker gets. Assessed (SSVC 2.0.3).What do these mean? →
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Suricata is a network Intrusion Detection System, Intrusion Prevention System and Network Security Monitoring engine. Prior to 7.0.17 and 8.0.6, crafted IPv4 and IPv6 address pairs can collide in the IPPair hash because src/ippair.c did not compare the IP address family before reusing IPPair-backed state. This can apply state from one IP family to another for xbits track ip_pair, FTP data expectations, and, on the 7.0 release line, thresholding, detection_filter, and rate_filter rules using track by_both, causing incorrect detection state. This issue is fixed in versions 8.0.6 and 7.0.17.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- OISF suricata
From 8.0.0 · fixed in 8.0.6; fixed in 7.0.17