Scoold: Forged JWT Accepted as Admin API Token Allowing Unauthorized Access to Sensitive Configuration and Logs
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 1.69.1
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
Summary
Scoold is a Q&A and a knowledge sharing platform for teams. Prior to 1.69.1, checkApiAuth() in src/main/java/com/erudika/scoold/utils/ScooldUtils.java accepts a JWT signed with app_secret_key or para_secret_key for /api/config and /api/stats without requiring a registered API-key jti, and maps the request to the hardcoded administrative API_USER. The special endpoint checks run even when scoold.api_enabled is false. An attacker who obtains either signing secret can forge a token that reads sensitive configuration and server logs and reaches privileged configuration functionality, while an ordinary login-session token is not sufficient. This issue is fixed in version 1.69.1.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- Erudika scoold
fixed in 1.69.1