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CVE-2026-57144

PraisonAI SandlockSandbox falls back to unrestricted subprocess execution when Landlock is unavailable

Published
Last modified
published
Not listed in CISA KEV
Fix
Fixed in 4.6.61
None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
  • Exploitation: poc
  • Automatable: no
  • Technical impact: total

Summary

PraisonAI, a multi-agent teams system, has a sandbox component (SandlockSandbox) meant to safely run untrusted code with kernel-enforced restrictions. On systems where that protection is unavailable, it silently ran code without those restrictions, so code could read files outside its allowed directory and make network connections despite network access being disabled.

Summarized by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5. Verify details against the original sources.

Read the original description

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 4.5.110 to before version 4.6.61, praisonai.sandbox.SandlockSandbox is documented and implemented as the kernel-enforced sandbox backend for untrusted code. Its SandboxConfig.native() path lets callers configure allowed filesystem paths and network=False. On systems where the optional sandlock module imports but reports that Landlock is unavailable, SandlockSandbox.execute() and run_command() do not fail closed. They silently fall back to SubprocessSandbox(self.config). That fallback keeps the same high-level native policy object but does not enforce the native filesystem or network boundary during code execution. A sandboxed payload can read files outside the configured allowed path and open network connections despite network=False. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.61.

Timeline

  1. CVE published
  2. First seen by cve.now
  3. CISA SSVC assessment

    Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total

  4. Record last updated

Affected versions

  • MervinPraison PraisonAI

    From 4.5.110 · fixed in 4.6.61

References 1

GitHub · MervinPraison/PraisonAI