Netty: Out-of-date OCSP Responses Accepted by OcspServerCertificateValidator
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 4.1.136.Final, 4.2.16.Final
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
Summary
Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final, the OcspServerCertificateValidator flags an out-of-date OCSP response but does not stop processing it, so an expired GOOD response is still reported as VALID, letting an on-path attacker replay a stale GOOD response to bypass revocation of a since-revoked certificate. Exploitation can lead to certificate revocation bypass via replay of an expired OCSP response. Any application using OcspServerCertificateValidator is affected; a revoked certificate can be accepted. This issue has been fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- netty netty
fixed in 4.1.136.Final; From 4.2.0.Final · fixed in 4.2.16.Final
- io.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocspMaven
From 4.2.0.Final · fixed in 4.2.16.Final
- io.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocspMaven
fixed in 4.1.136.Final