Netty has a Security Control Bypass via CORS Short-Circuit Failure
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 4.2.16.Final, 4.1.136.Final
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Versions 4.2.0.Final through 4.2.15.Final and 4.1.0.Final through 4.1.135.Final, are vulnerable to security control bypass during the origin evaluation process. CorsHandler provides a shortCircuit() configuration designed to reject unauthorized cross-origin requests immediately, acting as a security control before requests reach the application. However, due to a logical operator error in the origin evaluation process, this protection can be entirely bypassed. An attacker can bypass the short-circuit mechanism by sending a request with an Origin: null header. This failure forwards unauthorized requests to the backend application, bypassing intended access controls. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- netty netty
From 4.2.0.Final · fixed in 4.2.16.Final; From 4.1.0.Final · fixed in 4.1.136.Final
- io.netty:netty-codec-httpMaven
From 4.2.0.Final · fixed in 4.2.16.Final
- io.netty:netty-codec-httpMaven
fixed in 4.1.136.Final