Zammad: PGP signature spoofing via unvalidated verification return
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 7.0.2
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Zammad is a web based open source helpdesk/customer support system. Prior to 7.0.2, summary In Zammad's inbound PGP email processing, the return value of the gpg verification call was silently discarded. Regardless of whether gpg reported a valid, invalid, or missing signature, the handler unconditionally wrote sign: { success: true, comment: "Good signature" } to the article's security preferences. Impact Any sender could tamper with the body of a multipart/signed PGP email, or craft a message with an entirely fabricated or mismatched signature, and Zammad would display it to the recipient as cryptographically verified with a "Good signature" label. Users and agents relying on Zammad's signature indicator to confirm message authenticity and integrity would be misled into trusting modified or forged content. The vulnerability affects all inbound PGP-signed emails processed while the PGP integration is enabled. This issue is fixed in version 7.0.2.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- zammad zammad
fixed in 7.0.2