ComfyUI: Path traversal in LoadImage via the /prompt API allows arbitrary file existence probing and image exfiltration
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 0.28.0
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
ComfyUI is a modular diffusion model GUI, API, and backend with a graph-and-node interface. Prior to 0.28.0, folder_paths.get_annotated_filepath and exists_annotated_filepath join workflow-controlled annotated filenames to a base directory without a containment check, allowing an unauthenticated crafted POST /prompt workflow using LoadImage or sibling nodes to probe arbitrary host paths and exfiltrate image-format files through /view. LoadImage defines a VALIDATE_INPUTS method, which causes the execution engine to skip COMBO (input-directory) validation. Affected nodes include LoadImage, LoadImageMask, LoadImageOutput, LoadAudio, LoadLatent, LoadVideo, and Load3D. This issue is fixed in version 0.28.0.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- Comfy-Org ComfyUI
fixed in 0.28.0