wolfSSL_PKCS7_verify() reports success for degenerate (certs-only) PKCS#7 with no signer
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fix or patch referenced
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
wolfSSL_PKCS7_verify() returning success for a degenerate (certs-only) PKCS#7 object that contains no signer. Such an object has empty signerInfos, so the underlying signed-data verification succeeds without authenticating any content. The compatibility-layer verify path now rejects the object when no signer signature has actually been verified, so a PKCS#7 carrying no valid signature is no longer reported as verified. This is enforced regardless of the PKCS7_NOVERIFY flag, which only suppresses signer certificate chain validation and was never intended to waive the requirement that a signature exist. Only affects OpenSSL compatibility builds that call the PKCS7_verify() compatibility API on potentially degenerate PKCS#7 bundles.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- wolfSSL wolfSSL
From 3.15.7 · through 5.9.1