GeoNetwork: Unauthenticaded Server-Side Request Forgery in SLD Tool
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 4.2.17, 4.4.12
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- 1 Nuclei template
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
GeoNetwork is a catalog application to manage spatially referenced resources. Prior to 4.2.17 and 4.4.12, POST /api/tools/ogc/sld accepted a caller-supplied WMS server URL and performed a server-side HTTP GET without destination validation. An anonymous attacker could make the GeoNetwork server send requests to internal hosts that are not publicly reachable. When the outbound response was XML, the endpoint could store and return the fetched body, making the request forgery non-blind and enabling internal data disclosure, authorization bypass, and network reconnaissance. This issue is fixed in versions 4.2.17 and 4.4.12.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- geonetwork core-geonetwork
From 4.0.0 · fixed in 4.2.17; From 4.4.0 · fixed in 4.4.12
- org.geonetwork-opensource:gn-web-appMaven
From 4.4.0 · fixed in 4.4.12
- org.geonetwork-opensource:gn-web-appMaven
From 4.0.0 · fixed in 4.2.17