Logto: SAML IdP injects user-controlled profile attributes raw into signed assertions, allowing privilege escalation at relying Service Providers
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 1.41.0
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Logto is the modern, open-source auth infrastructure for SaaS and AI apps. Prior to 1.41.0, Logto's self-hosted SAML application IdP built the signed SAML response and assertion by string-substituting user-controlled profile attributes such as name, email, and custom attribute-mapping values into element-text placeholders of a SAML XML template using samlify 2.10.0, which left those placeholders unescaped. An authenticated low-privilege user could place XML markup in a profile attribute so Logto signed a forged SAML attribute, such as an arbitrary role, allowing privilege escalation at relying Service Providers that authorize on SAML attributes. This issue is fixed in version 1.41.0.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- logto-io logto
fixed in 1.41.0