free5GC AUSF uses non-constant-time authentication comparisons and logs XRES* in 5G-AKA
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 1.4.5
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network. Prior to 1.4.5, the AUSF component performs cryptographic authentication comparisons in internal/sbi/processor/ue_authentication.go with ordinary equality helpers. Auth5gAkaComfirmRequestProcedure compares RES* and XRES* with strings.EqualFold and logs the expected XRES* value at INFO level before comparison. EapAuthComfirmRequestProcedure compares AT_MAC and XMAC with bytes.Equal and evaluates XRES == RES with ordinary string equality. These comparisons can return at mismatch-dependent times, although testing did not demonstrate a practical remote timing oracle because of HTTP/SBI timing noise. The INFO log exposes authentication material to operators, log collectors, sidecars, or processes able to read AUSF logs. This issue is fixed in version 1.4.5.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- free5gc free5gc
fixed in 1.4.5
- github.com/free5gc/ausfGo
fixed in 1.4.5