Rocket.Chat: Email Parameter Fallback Leads To Account Takeover Within Apple OAuth
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 8.5.1, 8.4.4, 8.3.6, 8.2.6, 8.1.6, and 2 more
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: total
Summary
Rocket.Chat is an open-source, secure, fully customizable communications platform. Prior to 8.5.1, 8.4.4, 8.3.6, 8.2.6, 8.1.6, 8.0.7, and 7.10.13, in apps/meteor/app/apple/server/loginHandler.ts, handleIdentityToken parses a JWT issued by Apple during the OAuth flow. The try block checks for an email parameter. If the JWT does not contain an email address, the application falls back to accepting an arbitrary email value supplied directly in the request. Attackers are able to forge Apple JWTs that do not contain an email address and leverage this vulnerability to carry out account takeover attacks. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.5.1, 8.4.4, 8.3.6, 8.2.6, 8.1.6, 8.0.7, and 7.10.13.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- RocketChat Rocket.Chat
From 8.5.0-rc.0 · fixed in 8.5.1; From 8.4.0-rc.0 · fixed in 8.4.4; From 8.3.0-rc.0 · fixed in 8.3.6; From 8.2.0-rc.0 · fixed in 8.2.6; From 8.1.0-rc.0 · fixed in 8.1.6; From 7.11.0-rc.0 · fixed in 8.0.7; fixed in 7.10.13