Pimcore: Remote Code Execution via DataObject Class-Definition Field Name

Summary

Pimcore is an Open Source Data & Experience Management Platform. Prior to 11.5.19, 12.3.10, and 2026.1.6, the class-definition import endpoint /pimcore-studio/api/class/definition/configuration-view/detail/{id}/import accepts a DataObject field name that is emitted without an identifier allowlist by lib/DataObject/ClassBuilder/FieldDefinitionPropertiesBuilder.php into generated PHP properties and by models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Helper/Dao.php into ALTER TABLE identifiers. An authenticated user with the objects permission can inject PHP syntax into the generated DataObject class, causing attacker-controlled code in generated var/classes/DataObject/.php files to run when an object of that class is instantiated, and can also inject SQL identifier content into schema-changing statements. The central models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Data.php::setName() validation did not reject semicolons, braces, backticks, spaces, or other non-identifier characters. This issue is fixed in versions 11.5.19, 12.3.10, and 2026.1.6.

Timeline

1. Aug 28, 2026, 7:16 PM UTCCVE published
2. Aug 28, 2026, 8:06 PM UTCCISA SSVC assessment

   Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total

3. Aug 28, 2026, 8:06 PM UTCRecord last updated

Affected versions

• pimcore pimcore

  fixed in 11.5.19; From 12.0.0-RC1 · fixed in 12.3.10; From 2026.1.0 · fixed in 2026.1.6

• pimcore/pimcorePackagist

  fixed in 12.3.10

• pimcore/pimcorePackagist

  From 2026.1.0 · fixed in 2026.1.6

References 5