nebula-mesh: Unauthenticated OIDC login endpoint allocates unbounded in-memory state entries without rate limiting
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 0.5.0
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh VPN. From version 0.2.0 to before version 0.5.0, when OIDC is enabled, GET /ui/oidc/login is reachable without authentication and is registered outside the Web UI rate-limited auth routes. Every request creates a fresh random OIDC state value and stores it in an in-memory map for 10m. Expired states are swept lazily, but there is no rate limit or maximum live-state cap on the allocation path. An unauthenticated remote client can therefore grow OIDC.states for the full state TTL, bounded by request throughput rather than by configured auth rate limits. This issue has been patched in version 0.5.0.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- forgekeep nebula-mesh
From 0.2.0 · fixed in 0.5.0
- github.com/forgekeep/nebula-meshGo
From 0.4.0 · fixed in 0.5.0
- github.com/juev/nebula-meshGo
From 0.2.0
- github.com/forgekeep/nebula-meshGo
From 0.2.0 · fixed in 0.5.0