CUPS copy_model() creates a predictable PPD tempfile without O_EXCL/O_NOFOLLOW (symlink TOCTOU, lp → root)
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 2.4.20
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
OpenPrinting CUPS is an open source printing system for Linux and other Unix-like operating systems. Prior to 2.4.20, copy_model() in scheduler/ipp.c creates a predictable TempDir/<connection-number>.ppd path in an lp-group-writable directory and opens it as root without O_EXCL or O_NOFOLLOW. Exploitation requires an lp-group process able to write that directory to predict the connection-derived name and plant a symlink before the root open, while a privileged add-printer or modify-printer operation using a model PPD triggers copy_model(). The reporter treats an existing lp foothold and the privileged operation as distinct prerequisites, while the maintainer assesses high privileges because installing the relevant filter or administering the printer requires root or print-administrator access. If the race succeeds, the root scheduler follows the symlink and truncates or overwrites a root-writable target with generated PPD data, compromising file integrity or availability. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.20.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- OpenPrinting cups
fixed in 2.4.20