Pimcore Hotspotimage getDataFromResource() unrestricted Serialize::unserialize over object-store column
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 11.5.19, 12.3.10, 2026.1.6
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: total
Summary
Pimcore is an Open Source Data & Experience Management Platform. Prior to 11.5.19, 12.3.10, and 2026.1.6, Pimcore\Model\DataObject\ClassDefinition\Data\Hotspotimage::getDataFromResource() in models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Data/Hotspotimage.php passes the field __hotspots object-store column to Pimcore\Tool\Serialize::unserialize() without an allowed-classes restriction after JSON decoding fails. An attacker with a separate capability to write crafted PHP serialized bytes into that column can instantiate available classes and trigger magic methods when an affected DataObject is loaded, which can produce arbitrary file writes or code execution through bundled gadget chains. The related ImageGallery, Block, and Video callers use the same fallback pattern, but the identified June fix changes the Hotspotimage caller only. This issue is fixed for Hotspotimage in versions 11.5.19, 12.3.10, and 2026.1.6.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- pimcore pimcore
fixed in 11.5.19; From 12.0.0-RC1 · fixed in 12.3.10; From 2026.1.0 · fixed in 2026.1.6
- pimcore/pimcorePackagist
From 2026.1.0 · fixed in 2026.1.6
- pimcore/pimcorePackagist
fixed in 12.3.10