mchange-commons-java contains elements susceptible to abuse via JNDI injection and "deserialization gadgets"
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 0.6.0
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
Summary
mchange-commons-java is a Java library of shared utility classes used by mchange projects like the c3p0 connection pool. Prior to version 0.6.0, its JNDI ObjectFactory implementation (com.mchange.v2.naming.JavaBeanObjectFactory) will construct objects of arbitrary classes and initialize "JavaBean"-style properties, which for certain classes enables JNDI injection and "deserialization gadgets." Such initialization is unsafe for some classes: for example, setting the contentType property of a Swing JEditorPane to text/html and its text property to HTML containing a stylesheet <link> will provoke an HTTP GET on an arbitrary URL, potentially from within a trusted security domain. The problem is aggravated by the library's ReferenceIndirector, through which malicious JNDI Reference objects can be smuggled in for dereferencing wherever an application reads a Java-serialized object. This has been resolved in version 0.6.0.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- swaldman mchange-commons-java
fixed in 0.6.0
- com.mchange:mchange-commons-javaMaven
fixed in 0.6.0