Etherpad: Device-to-device author-token transfer endpoint is replayable, never expires, and exposes the cleartext author token
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 3.1.0
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
Summary
Etherpad is a real-time collaborative editor. From 2.6.0 until 3.1.0, Etherpad's src/node/hooks/express/tokenTransfer.ts uses POST /tokenTransfer to store an author token for transfer between browsers and exposes it through GET /tokenTransfer/{uuid}. Although the record includes createdAt, the transfer has no expiration check, is not removed after successful redemption, and is returned by res.send(tokenData), including the raw author token. An unauthenticated attacker who obtains a transfer UUID can repeatedly redeem it, receive fresh author cookies, read the cleartext token, and impersonate the originating author for pad read and write operations. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.0.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- ether etherpad
From 2.6.0 · fixed in 3.1.0
- ep_etherpad-litenpm
From 2.6.0 · fixed in 3.1.0