Pimcore: ClassDefinition UID regex missing end anchor allows SQL injection via Block.php unquoted table name
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 2026.1.5, 12.3.9
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Pimcore is an Open Source Data & Experience Management Platform. Prior to 2026.1.5, an authenticated user with the objects permission can submit a malicious ClassDefinition UID because the name and ID validation expressions in models/DataObject/ClassDefinition.php validate only the beginning of each value. When a data object of that class containing a Block field is loaded, Block::load in models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Data/Block.php incorporates the stored class ID into an unquoted object table identifier, allowing the UID to supply SQL syntax. The resulting query can read or modify arbitrary Pimcore database tables, including disclosure of password hashes, and the flaw represents an incomplete validation hardening because earlier work added a start anchor without enforcing the end of the identifier. This issue is fixed in version 2026.1.5.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- pimcore pimcore
fixed in 2026.1.5
- pimcore/pimcorePackagist
From 2026.1.0 · fixed in 2026.1.5
- pimcore/pimcorePackagist
fixed in 12.3.9