free5GC: NRF nnrf-nfm lacks NF Profile input validation — enables NF Registration Poisoning with arbitrary service endpoints
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 4.2.3, 4.2.2, 4.2.2+incompatible
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
Summary
free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network. In 4.2.2 and earlier, the NRF RegisterNFInstance handler at PUT /nnrf-nfm/v1/nf-instances/{nfInstanceID} accepts NF Profiles without enforcing UUID format, nfStatus enum values, heartBeatTimer ranges, mandatory profile fields, or nfServices.ipEndPoints address constraints. The invalid profiles are persisted in the MongoDB NfProfile collection and returned by NFDiscover, allowing an attacker with SBI access to advertise attacker-controlled network-function endpoints and redirect control-plane signaling. This can expose credentials and signaling, alter service discovery integrity, and deny service across network functions that trust the NRF. This issue is fixed in version 4.2.3.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- free5gc free5gc
fixed in 4.2.3
- github.com/free5gc/free5gcGo
fixed in 4.2.2
- github.com/free5gc/free5gcGo
fixed in 4.2.2+incompatible