SeaweedFS: Path traversal in the S3 and Iceberg REST gateways allows cross-bucket access
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 4.30, 0.0.0-20260526080459-dd1b4287899e
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- 1 proof of concept on GitHub, 1 Nuclei template
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
SeaweedFS is a distributed storage system for object storage (S3), file systems, and Iceberg tables. Prior to 4.30, the S3 API gateway and the Iceberg REST catalog gateway construct their routers with mux.NewRouter().SkipClean(true). With path cleaning disabled, a .. segment inside the URL survives routing, so a request such as `GET /bucket-A/../evil-bucket/key`, is matched as bucket=bucket-A, object=../evil-bucket/key. The captured object key is then joined into a filer path with util.JoinPath (S3) / path.Join (Iceberg), which collapse the .. server-side, so the actual read or write lands in evil-bucket. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.30.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- seaweedfs seaweedfs
fixed in 4.30
- github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfsGo
fixed in 0.0.0-20260526080459-dd1b4287899e