Lemmy: Blocked users can edit private messages sent before the block
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 0.19.19, 1.0.0-alpha.18
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Lemmy is a link aggregator and forum for the fediverse. Prior to 0.19.19 and 1.0.0-alpha.18, Lemmy blocks new private messages from a sender after the recipient blocks that sender, but the edit path skips the same block check. create_private_message checks the recipient's block list with PersonActions::read_block before inserting a message, while edit_private_message in crates/api/api_crud/src/private_message/update.rs only checks that the caller is orig_private_message.creator_id. The update then writes new content and returns the modified PrivateMessageView without consulting the recipient's block list, allowing a blocked sender to keep changing an old message that the recipient can still see and providing a post-block harassment path. This issue is fixed in versions 0.19.19 and 1.0.0-alpha.18.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- LemmyNet lemmy
fixed in 0.19.19; From 1.0.0-alpha.0 · fixed in 1.0.0-alpha.18