Budibase: Arbitrary file read by workspace-builder via PWA-zip symlink upload

Summary

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.9, `POST /api/pwa/process-zip` at packages/server/src/api/routes/static.ts:24 accepts a builder-uploaded .zip, extracts it with extract-zip@2.0.1 into a temp directory, then for each entry listed in icons.json validates the icon path, opens it, and streams the bytes into MinIO. The resulting object is served back via GET /api/assets/{appId}/pwa/{uuid}.png. extract-zip@2.0.1 preserves absolute symlink targets when restoring symlink entries. The icon-source validator at packages/server/src/api/controllers/static/index.ts:259-268 resolves the icon source string against baseDir (path.resolve), checks resolvedSrc.startsWith(baseDir + path.sep) against that string, and calls fs.existsSync(resolvedSrc) which follows symbolic links to confirm the target exists. None of the three calls reject symbolic-link entries. packages/backend-core/src/objectStore/objectStore.ts:302 then calls (await fsp.open(path)).createReadStream() on the resolved path. fsp.open follows the symlink, the target file's bytes stream into MinIO, and the response of the asset-fetch endpoint returns those bytes verbatim. Result: a workspace-level builder reads any file the server process can open. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.9.

Timeline

1. Jun 26, 2026, 8:32 PM UTCCVE published
2. Jun 27, 2026, 3:11 AM UTCCISA SSVC assessment

   Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total

3. Jun 27, 2026, 3:12 AM UTCRecord last updated

Affected versions

• Budibase budibase

  fixed in 3.39.9

• @budibase/servernpm

  fixed in 3.39.9

References 1