UEFI Firmware Parser: Heap out-of-bounds write in tiano decompressor `ReadCLen`
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 1.14
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: total
Summary
UEFI Firmware Parser parses BIOS, Intel ME, and UEFI firmware structures including volumes, file systems, and files. Prior to 1.14, ReadCLen() in uefi_firmware/compression/Tiano/Decompress.c reads Number from GetBits(Sd, CBIT) with CBIT = 9 and can obtain 511 entries for the 510-element Sd->mCLen heap array because its loop does not enforce Index < NC. The CharC == 2 run-length path can additionally request up to 531 zero writes through Sd->mCLen[Index++] = 0. The normal CompressedSection.process() to efi_compressor.TianoDecompress() to TianoDecompress() to DecodeC() to ReadCLen() parsing path therefore permits crafted Tiano or EFI compressed firmware to corrupt heap memory, deterministically crash the parsing process, and potentially execute code depending on build and runtime details. This issue is fixed in version 1.14.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- theopolis uefi-firmware-parser
fixed in 1.14
- uefi-firmwarePyPI
through 1.12