OctoPrint: File exfiltration possible via query parameters on upload endpoints
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 1.11.8, 2.0.0rc3
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: total
Summary
OctoPrint provides a web interface for controlling consumer 3D printers. Prior to 1.11.8 and 2.0.0rc3, OctoPrint's custom Tornado upload handler and Flask with Werkzeug parse request parameters differently, allowing an attacker with FILE_UPLOAD permission to inject reserved internal upload fields through query parameters or parser differentials despite the earlier GHSA-m9jh-jf9h-x3h2 fix. The affected endpoints are /api/files/{local|sdcard}, /api/languages, /plugin/backup/restore, and /plugin/pluginmanager/upload_file. An attacker can make OctoPrint treat an arbitrary host file as a temporary upload, move it into a downloadable upload directory, disclose configuration secrets or other readable files, and remove runtime files in a way that can affect a later restart. This issue is fixed in versions 1.11.8 and 2.0.0rc3.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- OctoPrint OctoPrint
fixed in 1.11.8; From 2.0.0rc1 · fixed in 2.0.0rc3
- octoprintPyPI
fixed in 1.11.8
- octoprintPyPI
From 2.0.0rc1 · fixed in 2.0.0rc3
- octoprintPyPI
fixed in 1.11.8; From 2.0.0rc1 · fixed in 2.0.0rc3