Network-AI has an an OS Command Injection issue

Summary

Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.9.1, the agent sandbox gates shell commands behind an allowlist (`SandboxPolicy.isCommandAllowed`), which THREAT_MODEL.md calls the main control against a compromised agent (Adversary 3.2). The allowlist glob-matches the whole command string, but `ShellExecutor` runs that string through `/bin/sh -c`. So any wildcard allow such as `git *`, `npm *` or `node *` also matches `git status; <anything>`, and a scoped command becomes arbitrary execution. The issue is fixed in v5.9.1. `ShellExecutor` now executes via `spawn(file, args, { shell: false })` using a quote-aware parsed argv, so no shell is invoked. `SandboxPolicy.isCommandAllowed` and the new `SandboxPolicy.tokenizeCommand` reject any unquoted shell metacharacter (`; & | $ ` ` ` ( ) < > { }` newline) or unterminated quote before the allowlist glob match; quoted metacharacters are preserved as literal argument data. Users should upgrade to `network-ai@5.9.1` or later. As defense in depth, avoid broad wildcard allowlist entries such as `node *` / `npm *` which are direct code execution by design.

Timeline

1. Jul 20, 2026, 4:24 PM UTCCVE published
2. Jul 21, 2026, 4:01 PM UTCCISA SSVC assessment

   Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total

3. Jul 21, 2026, 4:03 PM UTCRecord last updated

Affected versions

• Jovancoding Network-AI

  fixed in 5.9.1

• network-ainpm

  fixed in 5.9.1

References 2