Open WebUI: DNS Rebinding SSRF Bypass
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 0.11.0
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. Prior to 0.11.0, Open WebUI resolved a hostname during URL validation and rejected private, loopback, and link-local addresses, but the HTTP clients resolved the hostname again at connection time. An authenticated attacker who controlled authoritative DNS for a submitted hostname could answer with a public address during validation and an internal one during connection, reaching cloud metadata, loopback admin APIs, or internal services through URL ingest, chat image_url fetches, image editing, or OAuth profile-picture fetches, with most paths returning the response to the attacker and the OAuth path forwarding the OAuth access token. This issue is fixed in 0.11.0.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- open-webui open-webui
fixed in 0.11.0
- open-webuiPyPI
fixed in 0.11.0