Radius Controller May Delete a Container Resource via an Injected Deployment Annotation (Multi-Tenant Installs)

Summary

Radius is a cloud-native, portable application platform that makes app development easier for teams building cloud-native apps. Prior to 0.58.0, the Kubernetes controller deserializes the user-controlled radapp.io/status annotation on a Deployment and uses its container resource identifier for deletion without confirming ownership by that Deployment. An attacker with permission to modify Deployment annotations and knowledge of a target Radius resource ID can forge radapp.io/status and set radapp.io/enabled to false, causing reconciliation to enter the privileged deletion path for another tenant's Radius-managed container resource. In a multi-tenant installation this confused-deputy condition can delete another team's recoverable container resource and disrupt service; in a single-tenant installation the impact is limited to self denial of service. The multi-tenant Radius controller reads the annotations in pkg/controller/reconciler/annotations.go and reaches the privileged delete in pkg/controller/reconciler/deployment_reconciler.go. The issue does not disclose data, grant privileges, or provide persistence. This issue is fixed in version 0.58.0.

Timeline

1. Oct 14, 2026, 6:39 PM UTCCVE published
2. Oct 14, 2026, 7:42 PM UTCCISA SSVC assessment

   Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial

3. Oct 14, 2026, 7:42 PM UTCRecord last updated

Affected versions

• radius-project radius

  fixed in 0.58.0

• github.com/radius-project/radiusGo

  fixed in 0.58.0

References 4