Envoy Gateway: Wasm HTTP fetch decompresses gzip without output-size limit
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 1.7.4, 1.8.1
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Envoy Gateway is an open source project for managing Envoy Proxy as a standalone or Kubernetes-based application gateway. Prior to 1.7.4 and 1.8.1, getFileFromGZ in internal/wasm/httpfetcher.go calls io.ReadAll on a gzip.Reader without limiting decompressed output when a tenant-controlled EnvoyExtensionPolicy.spec.wasm[].code.http.url points to a reachable compressed Wasm payload. The 256 MiB compressed-input cap does not constrain the expanded size, no operator Wasm URL allowlist exists, and the optional sha256 check occurs only after decompression, so a comparatively small gzip stream can force a multi-gigabyte allocation in the shared controller. The resulting out-of-memory termination restarts the controller, re-reconciles the persistent custom resource, and can create a persistent cross-tenant control-plane outage. This issue is fixed in versions 1.7.4 and 1.8.1.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- envoyproxy gateway
fixed in 1.7.4; From 1.8.0-rc.0 · fixed in 1.8.1
- github.com/envoyproxy/gatewayGo
From 1.8.0-rc.0 · fixed in 1.8.1
- github.com/envoyproxy/gatewayGo
fixed in 1.7.4
- github.com/envoyproxy/gatewayGo
fixed in 1.7.4; From 1.8.0-rc.0 · fixed in 1.8.1