Ground Station: Unauthenticated out-of-containment file read via `sigmfplayback` `recordingPath`
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 0.4.13
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Ground Station is a browser-based suite for satellite tracking, SDR reception, hardware control, and telemetry decoding. Prior to version 0.4.13, the unauthenticated configure-sdr Socket.IO command accepts a recordingPath for the sigmf-playback SDR and backend/handlers/entities/sdr.py stores it without validation before backend/hardware/sigmfprobe.py opens the path without enforcing containment. An absolute path or parent-directory escape ending in .sigmf-meta is parsed as JSON and returned in reply["data"]["metadata"] by the get-sdr-parameters flow. Exploitation requires the metadata file to be readable JSON and to have a sibling .sigmf-data file, but it can disclose contents outside backend/data/recordings without authentication. This issue is fixed in version 0.4.13.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- sgoudelis ground-station
fixed in 0.4.13