drm/amd/display: Clamp HDMI HDCP2 rx_id_list read to buffer size
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Clamp HDMI HDCP2 rx_id_list read to buffer size [Why & How] During HDCP 2.x repeater authentication over HDMI, the driver reads the sink's RxStatus register and extracts a 10-bit message size field (max value 1023). This value is used as the read length for the ReceiverID list without being clamped to the size of the destination buffer rx_id_list[177]. A malicious HDMI repeater could advertise a message size larger than the buffer, causing an out-of-bounds write during the I2C read. Clamp the read length in mod_hdcp_read_rx_id_list() to the size of the rx_id_list buffer, matching the approach already used in the DP branch. (cherry picked from commit 229212219e4247d9486f8ba41ef087358490be09)
Timeline
- CVE published
Affected versions
- Linux Linux
Version range not reported
- Linux Linux
5.6
References 8
git.kernel.org
- stable/c/3c4444aec06c74fbc05661f370954ac814963c38
- stable/c/91fb41218c413989d8b6c837748751454b452d68
- stable/c/964e50ef7b8f09815a7d05b8326af700f8d5bc96
- stable/c/79e0273272a05fb26f9b1e55bf1a52eefc3b7b35
- stable/c/bfba882cfcd08f6540f72f48e786b6404f5d2c5b
- stable/c/1906064d50d194a145486e5caf3db3e708b6f6ef
- stable/c/98cfb7530ea91d8e5e928285cdce58e1131f6e83
- stable/c/f0f3981c43b32cadfe373d636d9e9ca522bb3702