Steeltoe vulnerable to management-port isolation bypass via spoofed Host header
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 4.2.0, 3.4.0
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Steeltoe is an open source project that provides a collection of libraries that helps users build cloud-native applications. When Steeltoe management endpoints versions 3.2.2 through 3.3.0 and 4.1.0 are configured to listen on an alternate port (`Management:Endpoints:Port` is configured), the middleware responsible for restricting access to the endpoints uses the `Host` HTTP header rather than the actual network socket port. Versions 3.4.0 and 4.2.0 patch the issue. If an immediate upgrade to a patched version is not possible, add explicit ASP.NET Core authorization (`RequireAuthorization`) to all sensitive actuator endpoints as a defense-in-depth measure independent of port isolation and/or configure the reverse proxy or load balancer to enforce the `Host` header value and prevent clients from setting an arbitrary port.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- SteeltoeOSS Steeltoe.Management.Endpoint
fixed in 4.2.0
- SteeltoeOSS Steeltoe.Management.EndpointCore
From 3.2.2 · fixed in 3.4.0
- Steeltoe.Management.EndpointNuGet
fixed in 4.2.0
- Steeltoe.Management.EndpointCoreNuGet
From 3.2.2 · fixed in 3.4.0