mcp-memory-service: Missing Authentication on Document API Endpoints Allows Unauthenticated Memory Read/Write/Delete
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 10.67.1
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: total
Summary
mcp-memory-service is a semantic memory layer for AI applications. Prior to 10.67.1, all HTTP routes under /api/documents/* in mcp-memory-service are served without any authentication dependency, even when the server is configured with an API key (MCP_API_KEY) or OAuth. An unauthenticated remote attacker can upload arbitrary content into the memory store (write), retrieve stored document content (read), and permanently delete memories belonging to authenticated users (delete) — all without supplying any credentials. The /api/memories counterpart correctly enforces authentication, making this an inconsistent and exploitable authentication boundary. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.67.1.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- doobidoo mcp-memory-service
fixed in 10.67.1
- mcp-memory-servicePyPI
fixed in 10.67.1