Mousehole: Unauthenticated HTTP/WebSocket boundary exposes and mutates MAM cookie state
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 0.4.0
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Mousehole is a background service to update a seedbox IP for MAM and web app to manage it. Prior to version 0.4.05, Mousehole's HTTP/WebSocket management boundary is reachable without application-layer authentication or browser/LAN provenance checks. The service stores a MyAnonamouse (MAM) session cookie in state and reuses the same cookie-bearing serialization for persisted state, public API responses, and WebSocket state updates. Any client that can reach the published Mousehole port can read cookie-bearing state, connect to WebSocket state updates, replace the stored cookie, or force MAM update side effects. The deployment examples publish port 5010 broadly with Docker's `5010:5010` syntax, which can make the issue reachable on mixed-trust LAN/VPN interfaces. Version 0.4.0 patches the issue.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- t-mart mousehole
fixed in 0.4.0